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Abstract 
 
Database Forensic investigation is a domain which deals with database contents and their 
metadata to reveal malicious activities on database systems. Even though it is still new, but 
due to the overwhelming challenges and issues in the domain, this makes database 
forensic become a fast growing and much sought after research area. Based on 
observations made, we found that database forensic suffers from having a common 
standard which could unify knowledge of the domain. Therefore, through this paper, we 
present the use of Design Science Research (DSR) as a research methodology to develop a 
Generic Database Forensic Investigation Process Model (DBFIPM). From the creation of 
DBFIPM, five common forensic investigation processes have been proposed namely, the i) 
identification, ii) collection, iii) preservation, iv) analysis and v) presentation process. From 
the DBFIPM, it allows the reconciliation of concepts and terminologies of all common 
databases forensic investigation processes. Thus, this will potentially facilitate the sharing of 
knowledge on database forensic investigation among domain stakeholders.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Database threats and crimes are growing day by 
day and are harming confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of database systems. Traditional 
database security mechanisms such as 
authentication, authorization and control access 
cannot be persistent and defend alone the growth 
of database threats and cybercrimes by itself [1]. 
Thus a database forensic field is required to identify 
and collect evidences against those crimes for 
analyzing and documenting the events that caused 
those crimes and reveal databases that are 
tampered [2].   
Database forensic is a branch of digital forensic 
that deals with database contents, metadata, log 
files, data files, and memory data in order to create 
a timeline, relationship or recover relevant data [3]. 
Database forensic (DBF) research still frequently 
reflects on the reasons why this is the case; in fact, 
only a few years ago hardly any scientific research 
existed about database forensics despite the 
realization that such work was urgently needed [4]. 
One possible reason for the lack of researches is the 
inherent complexity of a database management 
system (DBMS) when compared to, file systems [5]. 
While files are often abstracted as streams of bytes, a 
database is a collection of data where data 
elements are related to one another. The process or 
procedure that is used with digital investigation will 
directly affect the results of the examination. 
Selecting the unfitting investigative processes may 
lead to damage or lost evidences [6]. Avoiding one 
phase or changing any of the phases may lead to 
indecisive consequences; and give invalid 
conclusions. “Evidences captured in an ad hoc or 
unstructured manner may risk not being admissible in 
the court of law”. 
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Several investigation models have been proposed by 
various authors over the years especially in digital 
forensic. Through our observation and analysis, many 
trends and features have been introduced by these 
models. However some of them focused on specific 
scenarios while the others focused on generic 
scenarios. Some of them have relative details while 
the others seem to be general. It could be a bit 
challenging or even unclear particularly to the newer 
forensic investigator to adopt the accurate or proper 
investigation model.  
Due to the lack of generic database forensic 
investigation process model [4], the main objective 
of this study is to provide an obvious structure which is 
called Database Forensic Process Investigation 
Process Model (DBFIPM) to unify, facilitate, and share 
database forensic investigation process knowledge 
amongst database users and practitioners. This 
model provides a pure and specific database 
forensic concepts and terminologies which are used 
in the database forensic investigation. Unifying these 
concepts in one conceptual model will increase 
knowledge of users, newcomers and practitioners. 
Additionally, it will reduce the complexity and 
ambiguity of the investigation. The paper is organized 
as follows: Section II highlights the database forensic 
challenges and issues 
In Section III we reviewed the existing investigation 
process models. Section IV displays a methodology 
which is used to propose a common phase of the 
investigation process. The results and discussion are 
displayed in Section V. The conclusion and future 
work are discussed in Section VI. 
  
 
2.0 DATABASE FORENSIC CHALLENGES AND 
ISSUES  
 
The Database Forensic field has been suffering from 
several challenges and issues, which make it 
heterogeneous, complicated and ambiguous 
amongst researchers, investigators and organizations. 
A variety of database infrastructure, multidimensional 
nature of database systems, several database 
forensic artifacts and lack of Database Forensic 
knowledge management are considered the main 
challenges and issues of Database Forensic field [2, 3, 
7-9]. Additionally, Database Forensic knowledge is 
scattered everywhere on the internet, in books, 
dissertations, organizations, journals, chapters and 
online databases.  
Database systems have a variety of infrastructures 
and services which totally dissimilar from one 
database system to another [1], Oracle database 
system has specific infrastructure and services which 
are dissimilar of other database systems such MS SQL 
Server, MySQL Server, and DB2.  Physically, it consists 
of three kinds of physical operating files such as data 
files, log files, and control files. Thus each of the 
database systems has its own specific infrastructure 
and service.  On the other hand, and based on the 
ANSI/SPARK model, the database system was divided 
into four layers known as the data model, data 
dictionary, and application schema and application 
data [9]. Accordingly, the specific database varies in 
forensic artifacts such as methods, models, 
frameworks, tools, activities, policies and so on. In the 
same context of Database Forensic issues, it has 
been suffering in terms of the multidimensional in 
nature of database systems.  
A database system is multi-dimensional nature by 
default which consists of three levels such as the 
internal level, conceptual level, and external level 
from the bottom to top [4]. The internal level contains 
a physical operating file which considers the main 
dynamo of a database system. The conceptual level 
is the logical level which represents the logical 
infrastructure of database schema such as users, 
tables, indexes, procedures etc. the external level 
represents the GUI which deals with real users to 
facilitate manipulating data. Therefore, the various 
dimensions of database systems have been affected 
considerably on the Database Forensic. 
Consequently, it has been classified into three 
dimensions namely the destroyed dimension, 
compromised dimension and changed dimension 
[4]. Accordingly, investigators cannot determine 
which dimension has been tampered with and in 
which dimension the investigation will be conducted.  
Additionally, this variety of dimensions has produced 
several database forensic artifacts which are dealing 
with specific database systems incidents.    
Subsequently, several of database forensic 
artifacts have been produced and spread 
everywhere.  Examiners/investigators have utilized it 
to discover database incidents and reveal who is 
tampering with them? When did tampering happen? 
What did the data tamper with? And also why and 
how did the tampering happen. For example of 
Database Forensic artifacts, investigation process 
models, frameworks, algorithms, methods, tools, 
activities, techniques, policies, procedures, 
transactions and laws.   
Specific Database Forensic investigation process 
models have been introduced to dealing with 
specific database systems. Oracle database system 
has its own process model which used to reveal 
database malicious activities [10]. However, it 
concentrated on reveal SQL injection attacks in 
database systems. Similarly, MS SQL Server has its own 
process methodology which consists of four process 
phases namely investigation preparedness, incident 
verification, artifact collection and artifacts analysis 
to discover database incidents [11].  
Correspondingly, the MySQL database Server 
used a framework to reveal incidents, which 
developed by [12]. Nevertheless, the specific DBF 
investigation process models which are discussed 
have sharing processes, and terminologies. Arguably, 
digital forensic investigation process models may not 
be suitable for Database Forensic investigation due 
to several perspectives such as Database Forensic 
challenges and issues [13].     
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Several digital forensic investigation process models 
have been developed to discover digital crimes of 
computers, networks, mobiles and internet. However, 
the exiting models may not be suitable to deal with 
database incidents due to several perspectives as 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. Furthermore, 
digital forensic practices do not reflect 
characteristics of IT governance related to 
transactional databases [13]. Moreover, traditional 
digital forensic practices may not be appropriate to 
analyze a large volume of data stored in database 
servers [14]. Digital Forensics is not suitable for 
database systems mainly due to a concentration on 
identification, collection, handling, storage, incident 
response and training. Additionally, database events 
may be difficult to trace, unless mutual aid among 
digital investigations have to be added with 
database analysis [13]. Traditional digital 
investigations require shutting down of the target 
system down, and the physical removal of hard drive 
for its later imaging [15]. Assuming that target system 
is a database server, removing and imaging its hard 
drive is counterproductive because production 
servers are huge data storages which cannot be shut 
down, and their drives may be far larger than any 
external drive in the market, therefore it is impossible 
to image into a standard external drive [16]. 
Consequently, imaging just relevant evidence, like 
important transactional logs related to suspicious 
transactions, should be considered. In order to do 
this, “database log environment‟ has to be 
controlled for producing specific logs to record 
suspicious transactions, using simple SQL procedures 
to support investigation.  
 In summary of this Section, DBF domain has 
suffered several issues which make it complicated 
and heterogeneous amongst researchers and 
investigators. Nevertheless, and despite of 
heterogeneous and variety of forensic artifacts of 
Database Forensic, it has numerous sharing concepts 
and characteristics which have been highlighted in 
this study such as forensic dimensions, database 
layers, policies, procedures, investigators, 
identification, collection, log files, transactions, SQL 
statements, and incidents, which need to be 
harmonized and unified using metamodeling 
approach to facilitate investigation task.  Therefore 
this study highlighted two main issues. The first issue, 
lacks of common investigation process model of 
Database Forensic which is the main purpose of this 
study, and the Second issue lack of abstract 
metamodel to structuring and managing whole 
Database Forensic Knowledge. The Second issue will 
be the future work of this study 
 
 
3.0 INVESTIGATION PROCESS MODEL 
REVIEWED 
 
The digital investigations models that are proposed 
and suggested in digital forensic domains are not 
small; therefore it would be quite difficult to review all 
of them. We reviewed the models based on 
chronological order, at least one model is proposed 
per year. Our reviewing and selection are not based 
on the features or properties of the models that 
determine that the model is better or greater than 
the other models. Our objective is to recognize and 
select the investigation phases from investigation 
models rather than choosing which model is the best. 
Table 1 displays 21 digital forensic investigation 
process models which have been identified and 
collected. 
 
Table 1 Digital Forensic Investigation Process Models 
 
Model Investigation Process Phases References 
M1 Acquisition, Identification, Evaluation, 
Admission. 
[17] 
M2 Acquiring, Authenticating ,analysis [81] 
M3 Identification, Preservation, Collection, 
Examination, Analysis,  Presentation, 
Decision 
[19] 
M4 Identification, Preparation, Approach 
strategy, Preservation, Collection, 
Examination, Analysis, Presentation, 
Returning evidences 
 
[02] 
M5 Readiness, Deployment, Physical 
investigation, Digital  investigation, 
Review 
[08] 
M6 Readiness , Deployment , Traceback, 
Dynamite, Review 
[00] 
M7 Awareness, Authorization, Planning, 
Notification, Search, Collection, 
Transportation, Storage, Examination, 
Hypothesis, Presentation, Proof/ 
Defense, Dissemination. 
 
[02] 
M8 Readiness, Development, Physical 
crime scene investigation, Digital 
Crime Sense investigation, 
Presentation. 
[02] 
M9 Preparation, Investigation, Presentation [02] 
M10 Pre-Analysis, Analysis,  Post-analysis [02] 
M11 Planning, Identification, 
Reconnaissance, Transport & Storage, 
Analysis, Proof & Defense, Archive 
Storage. 
 
[02] 
M12 Preparation, Incident, Incident 
response, Digital forensic investigation 
& Physical investigation, Presentation. 
 
[01] 
M13 
 
Suspend database Operation, 
Collection Data, Preservation Data, 
Analysis, Reconstruct the database, 
Restore Database Integrity 
 
[82] 
M14 Setup the evidence collection server, 
Perform general steps to get basic 
information, Collection, analysis, notify 
[02] 
M15 Investigation preparation, Incident 
verification, artifact collection, 
preservation, artifact analysis, Report. 
 
[88] 
M16 Detection server, Data collection, 
Investigation of data collection 
[22] 
M17 Identification, Artifact collection,   
Preservation,  Reconstruction,  Artifact 
analysis, Report 
[80] 
M 18 Collection [28] 
M 19 Collection , preservation [20] 
M 20 Detection Covert System. [22] 
M 21 Incident reporting, Examination [22] 
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Model Investigation Process Phases References 
Preparation, Physical Examination, 
Digital Examination, Documentation 
and Presentation, Post examination, 
Post Examination Analysis 
 
 
4.0  METHODOLOGY  
 
This study utilizes Design Science Research (DSR)  
methodology towards propose process artifacts 
which is called DBFIPM [35, 36]. Design Science 
Research (DSR) is defined as research methodology 
that is used to create new and persistent artifacts for 
a special problem domain [35]. DSR concentrates on 
IT artifact with a high importance on significance in 
the application domain. According to [37] creation 
of DSR can be illustrated into four kinds of artifacts 
which include: constructs that organize the language 
to identify problems and solutions, models that use 
this language to describe problems and solutions, 
methods that define processes that offer assistance 
on how to answer problems and instantiations which 
are defined as combinations of constructs, models, 
and methods. DSR cycle includes a manner of 
assessment and repetition against produced 
artifacts. It obviously insists on the building and 
assessment of the artifact to be completely 
performed before the artifact is offered to users. 
According to [36] design science process includes six 
steps:  
 
4,1  Identify and Collect Models 
 
Twenty one generic and specific digital process 
models have been identified, reviewed and 
collected, towards propose DBFIPM. Table 1 displays 
these models.  
 
4.2 Extract Investigation Process Phases and 
Candidate Common Process Phases   
 
Fifty nine investigation process phases extracted from 
21 digital process models. Table1 shows investigation 
process phases which are displayed in the 
investigation process phase’s column.  
Frequency Based Selection (FBS) is a feature 
selection technique that evaluates the importance 
of individual processes in the model developed [38].  
It is based on the idea that the best model is formed 
using the most common processes by performing 
Frequency-based Selection, processes that do not 
have correlations (or a need) to the classification are 
removed from the developed model. Thus 31 process 
phases have selected over 59 processes towards 
developing DBFIPM. Table 2 displays the 
comprehensive analysis of digital forensic 
investigation process models. 
Using the process frequency, an important value 
for each process in the developed model is 
estimated and expressed as the ‘Degree of 
Confidence (DoC)’. This value designates the 
expected probability that the developed model 
process is used in a randomly chosen DBF and digital 
forensic process models. The DoC is derived by 
dividing ‘the frequency of how many times a process 
appears in all the investigated models’ with ‘the total 
number of models’. For this purpose, DoC is based on 
the list of processes that appear in the proposed 
developed model and is defined as follows: 
 
DoC =   Frequency of Process   x 100%             (1) 
                     Total Models 
 
The following five categories of processes based on 
their DoC are follows: 
1. Very Strong (100 – 70 %), 
2. Strong (69 – 50 %), 
3. Moderate (49 – 30 %), 
4. Mild (29 – 11 %), and 
5. Very Mild (10 – 0 %). 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the candidate common process 
phases which consist of the DBFIPM. 
 
4.3  Allocate Synonyms Investigation Process with the 
Fitting Common Processes  
 
After designating the common processes phases 
using FBS in Step 2, the synonyms investigation 
processes which have similar activities are allocated 
among common phases based on their 
functionalities and activities. Table 2 shows the 
common process phases and their synonyms. 
 
4.4  Assign Obvious Definition of Each Which is of the 
Candidate Common Process  
 
Several definitions have been assigned to each 
which is of the common process phases based on 
the aim and functionality of the process. However, in 
this study, the authors will choose and adapt the best 
definition which fits with the Database Forensic 
Investigation. Section V will explain this step. 
 
4.5  Determine Specific Concepts Which are Related 
to Candidate Common Process Phases 
 
Practically, the concepts and terminologies which 
form the common process phases are determined in 
this step to give more clarification of the proposed 
model nature. Figure 2 shows the conceptual generic 
database forensic investigation process model. The 
concepts which are related with common concepts 
are shown in Figure 2. 
 
4.6 Identify Conceptual Relationships Among 
Common Process Phases and Their Concepts 
 
The conceptual relationships among common 
process phases and their concepts allow 
investigators and users to determine the boundaries 
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of concepts and their dependencies, to develop 
their own models from the main conceptual model.   
 
 
5.0  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Forensic investigation models that have a wider and 
specific coverage of database forensic domain are 
identified, collected, reviewed and listed in Table 1.  
Comprehensive analysis of these models and their 
process phases are shown in Table 2. Fifty nine 
investigation process phases have extracted, 
reviewed and compared towards candidate 
common investigation process phases. Nevertheless, 
31 process phases have been selected to candidate 
the more frequent and suitable processes for the 
Database Forensic investigation domain. Thus, five 
common investigation process phases have been 
selected based on their frequency and repeating in 
process models using FBS method which is mentioned 
in Section IV.  
In this study, the investigation process phases are 
divided into two parts: Pure processes and Synonym 
processes. Pure processes are the processes that 
have perfect and clear names such as identification, 
collection, analysis, document, preparation, and 
presentation, whereas the Synonyms processes are 
the processes that have alternative names of the 
pure names for example acquisition, search and 
identify evidence, and reconnaissance is the 
synonym names of the collection process phase.  
Consequently, the five common investigation 
process phases which have been selected are: 
Identification, Collection, Preservation, Analysis and 
Presentation phase. Table 2 shows five colors which 
represent these phases. Hence, Red color represents 
the pure process phase which is called Identification 
Process Phase including its synonym processes such 
as incident verification, authentication, preparation, 
approach strategy, readiness, and so on, while the 
other colors like Green, Yellow, Blue, and Brown 
represent the Collection Process Phase, Preservation 
Process Phase, Analysis Process Phase, Presentation 
Process Phase as well as their synonym processes 
respectively. The common investigation process 
phases and their synonyms represent the most 
process phases which probably have covered the 
digital forensic discipline.  Table 3 explains the DoC of 
value for each common process phase and its 
synonym process.  
Practically, the authors reconcile, and improve 
the common investigation process phases by adding 
mandatory and optional forensic concepts and 
terminologies which distinguish the proposed model. 
For example, the mandatory forensic concepts and 
terminologies are law/regulation, database 
resources, investigation team, authorization, 
detection server, database incident, identification, 
preservation, and volatile and nonvolatile artifacts, 
whereas the optional concepts and terminologies 
are network resources, and OS resources which are 
displayed in Figure 2.  
The advantages of this model are it reduces 
confusion and heterogeneous of the investigation 
task through providing an obvious structure which 
has pure database forensic investigation concepts 
such as forensic methods, algorithms, detection 
servers, volatile and nonvolatile artifacts, gathering 
evidences , database servers, database resources, 
guidelines, analysis, hashing, documentations, and so 
on. Additionally, offering customizing building models 
for example you can build your own model from 
Conceptual Database Forensic Investigation Process 
Model to solve your problem like: detect server 
model, detect database tampering model, detect 
database model, analysis volatile artifacts or 
nonvolatile and submit report models and so on.  
Thus the user can easily develop a customized 
model.  
 
5.1  Identification Process Phase 
 
Recognizing an incident from indicators and 
determining its type. This is not explicitly within the 
field of forensics, but significant because it impacts 
other steps. It prepares tools, techniques, search 
warrants, and monitoring authorizations and 
management support” [20]. The primary goal of 
identification process phase to identify investigation 
requirements concepts such as database resources, 
operating system resources, network resources, 
investigation teams, investigations techniques, 
investigation environment, policies, laws and 
regulations, authorizations and data associated with 
database incident. 
Protect crime scene must be captured, protected 
and documented in details using proper procedures 
and experienced teams. The investigations teams 
should be skilled and experienced to avoid altered or 
damaged evidences during the investigation task. 
Detection server where database resides and 
database incident occurred is the first investigation 
check. 
Detection methods (network scanning tools & DB 
detection methods) and staff interview (high access 
users) are using to provide specific information that 
used to assist investigators in detecting host machine 
and database server. Thus the detection sever report 
will be produced with detailed information about the 
detection server. Identification process phase is 
displayed in detail in Figure 2. 
Investigation requirement concepts should be 
described in detail to give the Database Forensic 
investigation community unified access point of 
database forensic knowledge.  Database resources 
concept is a collection of volatile and nonvolatile 
artifacts which are discussed in Section II.  Thus, the 
database log files, history files, data files, 
authentication files, backup files, archive files, 
auditing files, alert files, trace files, password and 
parameter files, transaction logs, data cache, SQL 
cache, shared pool cache; data dictionary caches 
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should be identified, captured, documented and 
protected.  An operating systems resources concept 
is a group of hardware and software concepts. 
Hardware concepts include hard disk drives, 
compact disks, flash disks, flash memory, main 
memory, PCs, laptops, and smartphones, whereas 
software concepts includes Microsoft Windows 
systems, Macintosh systems, and application 
programs. Another resource is network resources 
concept which includes TCP/IP, network traffic data 
sources firewalls, routers, packet sniffers, protocol 
analyzer, intrusion detection systems (IDS), remote 
access control, security event management 
software, network forensic analysis tools), dynamic 
host configuration protocol servers (DHCP), network 
monitoring software, internet server provider 
records(ISP), client server application, hosts’ network 
configurations and connections, collecting network 
traffic data (legal considerations) [39]. Investigation 
team concept is a certified, skilled and experienced 
team that has enough training and previous 
experiences in that same field. It is classified into 
three investigation teams:  The Identification team, 
the Collection and the Preservation team, and the 
Analysis and Presentation team. The identification 
team in collaboration with the organization 
management team is charge of preparing and 
identifying identification requirements resources and 
detecting the database server and database 
incident, and prepare the identification report, 
whereas the collection team is responsible of for 
collecting and preserving volatile and nonvolatile 
data taking into account the legal considerations in 
protecting information privacy, as well as generate 
collection and preservation reports to the analysis 
team. The analysis team has a powerful experience 
of analysis tools and algorithms to reveal database 
incidents through reconstructing database activities 
and discover: Who is a criminal? When did the crime 
happen? What data did it tamper? Why and how 
did the crime happen? Also restoring and recovering 
database continuity and integrity as soon as possible. 
Additionally, to produce the analysis and 
presentation report this is submitted to the top 
management and court. The most important issue 
that the investigation team must focus in is the trust of 
using investigation techniques to avoid damage or 
lost valuable evidences. Investigation Techniques 
concept is a collection of investigation tools, 
methods, and algorithms that are used to detect, 
gather, protect, analyze, reconstruct, recover and 
document database events. The investigation task 
should be achieved in a secure and trusted 
environment.    
The Investigation environment concept considers 
the media that contains investigation procedures 
and functions. It includes the host server, alternative 
server, location, laboratory, and safety measures and 
investigation teams, and also must take into account 
fluctuations in the air in terms of humidity and 
temperature in order to examine and store 
procedures properly. Host server is the place where 
target database, OS, and applications reside. The 
alternative server is another server that maybe used 
during the investigation task to conduct main or 
additional examination. Location is the place where 
the investigation task is conducting; it may be 
conducted in the same place as the host server or 
moved to laboratory. The laboratory is full of the 
equipment’s testing place which has whole 
opportunities and safety measures to conduct the 
investigation task. The safety measures are tools, 
policies, and awareness’s that must follow, to protect 
valuable evidences and ensures the results. Examples 
of safety measures are fire extinguishers, power 
supply to avoid power outage, air filters, physical 
security (manual lock, auto lock, CCTV, alerts, 
smoking alerts, biometric devices), security guard, 
awareness posters, policies that define responsibilities 
and penalties in case of disasters that will happen. In 
fact investigation environment must be far-off 
flooding and earthquake regions which may cause 
damage and loss of data. Investigations teams must 
follow organization policies and take into account 
the laws and regulations of territory/state to avoid 
any prosecution in future.   
Identifying Policies concepts of organization is 
giving investigators a general understanding of 
organization purposes, limitations, and procedures 
which must be followed and complied.  Organization 
policies are procedures and rules that govern 
organization behaviors. Investigators teams should 
comply and understand organization policies before 
the start of the investigation steps. Reviewing these 
policies will give investigators knowledge about 
procedures and rules which may be conducted 
when incidents/disasters happened. For example if 
data tampered, intrusion, misused, lost, theft, 
compromised, damaged, deleted, changed, or 
fraud then what the offer procedures that should be 
complied with to mitigate or solve it.  Strangeness or 
weaknesses of organization policies depend on 
orientations of organization and type of sponsored 
organization security. Therefore, the investigation 
team must assess and understand organization 
policies to avoid any prosecution in future when an 
unnatural action happens.       
Laws or regulations are other concepts that 
should be identified and prepared for the 
investigation teams. Database forensic is a relatively 
new discipline to the courts and many of the existing 
laws used to prosecute computer related crimes, 
legal precedents and practices related to database 
forensics are in a state of flux, therefore it is very 
important for the forensic investigator teams to 
collect evidence in a way that is legally admissible in 
court. Forensic investigation team should also be 
aware of privacy laws and country specific laws that 
are imposed on data collection and retention for 
forensic purposes, violation of any one of these laws 
during practice of cyber forensics could constitute a 
federal felony. The existing laws/regulations are 
specifying investigations and responds to security 
breaches or policy violations. For example finalized 
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HIPPA (Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 8222) rules include “information 
security” which encompasses incident response 
describing the attempted or successful unauthorized 
access, use, disclosure, modification or destruction of 
information or interference with system operations in 
an information system. HIPPA specifies that there 
should be thorough analysis and reporting of security 
incidents [12]. This gives rise to the need for database 
forensics which satisfies this demand. Organizations 
must, therefore, consider their incidence response 
policies carefully, which are part of their overall 
security policies. 
Authentication, authorization, and accounting 
(AAA) concepts are a term for a framework for 
intelligently controlling access to computer resources 
(Network resources, OS resources, Database 
Resources), enforcing policies, auditing usage, and 
providing the information necessary to bill for 
services. These combined processes are considered 
important for effective network management and 
security.  Forensic investigator teams are using these 
processes to get access to computer target to 
achieving their mission. As the first process, 
authentication is providing a way of identifying a 
user, typically by having the user enter a valid user 
name and valid password before access is granted. 
The process of authentication is based on each user 
having a unique set of criteria for gaining access. The 
AA server compares a user's authentication 
credentials with other user credentials stored in a 
database. If the credentials match, the user is 
granted access to the network.  If the credentials are 
at variance, authentication fails and network access 
is denied.  Following authentication, a user must gain 
authorization for doing certain tasks. After logging 
into a system, for instance, the user may try to issue 
commands. The authorization process determines 
whether the user has the authority to issue such 
commands. Simply put, authorization is the process of 
enforcing policies: determining what types or 
qualities of activities, resources, or services a user is 
permitted. Usually, authorization occurs within the 
context of authentication. Once you have 
authenticated a user, they may be authorized for 
different types of access or activity. Therefore, and in 
this case forensic investigation teams are using these 
processes to get accessing to network and database 
resources to achieving their mission.  However, in 
some cases, especially when complaints have been 
raised against a malicious company. Malicious 
companies are doing illegal activities such as frauds 
or suspicious businesses. In this case the organization 
management is attempting to covert database 
server (permanent server) for a while to hide their 
activities.  Thus the forensic investigation teams have 
two trends: protect crime scene and server 
detection, Figure 1 shows the processes that forensic 
investigators may follow.    
Server detection deals with a method of 
detecting the server driving a database system.  In 
case the internal system of a company is 
investigated, there are various systems to be 
examined as an investigation target and the 
investigation should be carried out within a time limit, 
it is difficult to judge what system should be first 
selected and checked into. In such a case, it is 
required to grasp the overall network circumstance in 
the company as soon as possible, so it is important to 
acquire the network topology inside the company. 
To acquire the network topology, detecting server 
group systems and the host system will be the main 
purpose and this study especially focuses on 
detecting the database server where data is stored 
[30, 33]. Thus, detection methods are divided into 
two parts: Detection Methods and Staff Interview as 
illustrated in Figure 1. Detection Methods include 
Network Forensic Analysis Tools (NFAT), and DB 
Detection Methods. Network Forensic Analysis Tools 
allow administrators to monitor networks, gather all 
information about anomalous traffic, assist in network 
crime investigation and help in generating a suitable 
incident response [40]. NFATs also help in analyzing 
the insider theft and misuse of resources, predict 
attack targets in near future, perform risk assessment, 
evaluate network performance, and help to protect 
intellectual propriety. Many commands are available 
inbuilt in modern operating systems which can be 
used for assisting network forensics [40, 41].  
DB Detection Methods  are used to detect: 
database server either in normal or in covert case, 
database schema, user accounts, privileges, files 
locations, and target files [33], [30].  In the case when 
database hides, an investigator looks into the 
organization that is suspected of illegal acts, much 
human power and time will be required in order to 
detect the covert database system as evidence 
about the case, due to the reason that the structure 
of computers and networks is highly complicated. In 
addition, if the organization intentionally builds the 
covert database system for storing and managing 
data then investigators should be placed in a 
predicament to detect it. For the reasons given 
above, the investigator needs digital forensic 
technologies which effectively investigate the case 
and obtain evidence about its system structure of the 
computer and network [33]. The digital forensic 
techniques are used to detect covert database are 
DB traces detector, Net-BIOS, ping sweep, port 
scanning, and ActiveX Data Object technology [42, 
43].  
The second method which is used to detect 
database server is Staff Interview, it is very important 
to have interviews with staff member of the company 
in charge of the system. In the interview stage, it is 
possible to acquire information difficult to acquire 
through tools. As information is possible to acquire, 
we are able to know the location of servers and 
account of information in addition to basic 
information such as server IP and service port 
numbers. In fact, it is a crucial stage because we can 
possibly acquire more information through interviews 
than by scanning the database server with scanning 
tools.  
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Besides such a method, we also have a way of 
detecting servers by examining the contents of the 
host computer inside a company. To work on the 
host computer, High Access Users such as DBA, 
system administrator, and powered employees 
should access the database server and then trace 
remaining in the host computer.  Basically, one of the 
typical traces remaining in the database server is 
that information about the database server 
remaining in the setting’s file titled ’tnsnames.ora’ in 
the case of Oracle [30].  
 
 
Table 2 Comprehensive Analysis of Digital Forensic Investigation Process Models 
 
Process M 
1 
M 
2 
M 
3 
M 
4 
M 
5 
M 
6 
M 
7 
M 
8 
M 
9 
M 
10 
M 
11 
M 
12 
M 
13 
M 
14 
M 
15 
M 
16 
M 
17 
M 
18 
M
19 
M
20 
M 
21 
Type 
Identification √  √ √  √     √      √     Pure 
Detection                    √  Synonym 
Detection 
Server 
               √      synonym 
Planning       √    √           synonym 
Investigation 
Preparation 
              √       synonym 
Setup The 
Evidence 
Collection 
Server 
             √        synonym 
Suspend 
Database 
Operation 
            √         synonym 
Readiness     √   √              synonym 
Examination 
Preparation 
                    √ synonym 
Authentication  √                    synonym 
Preparation    √     √   √          Pure 
Collection   √ √  √       √ √  √ √ √ √ √  Pure 
Acquisition √                     synonym 
Acquiring  √                    synonym 
Digital Crime 
Investigation 
    √   √    √          synonym 
Search       √               synonym 
Pre-Analysis          √            synonym 
Collect 
Artifacts 
              √       synonym 
Digital 
Examination 
                    √ synonym 
Preservation   √ √  √       √  √  √  √   Pure 
Defense       √               synonym 
Transport& 
Storage 
          √           synonym 
Examination                     √ synonym 
Analysis  √ √ √  √    √ √  √ √   √     Pure 
Reconstruction             √         synonym 
Artifacts 
Analysis 
              √  √     synonym 
Investigation 
of Data 
Collection 
               √      synonym 
Presentation   √ √  √   √ √  √          Pure 
Documentati
on 
                    √ synonym 
Report                 √     synonym 
Disseminating       √               synonym 
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Table 3 Degree of Confidence of Common Investigation Process Phases 
 
Process M 
1 
M 
2 
M 
3 
M 
4 
M 
5 
M 
6 
M 
7 
M 
8 
M 
9 
M 
10 
M 
11 
M 
12 
M 
13 
M 
14 
M 
15 
M 
16 
M 
17 
M 
18 
M
19 
M
20 
M 
21 
Frequency 
Identification √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ √ √ √   √ √ 85% 
Collection √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ 90% 
Preservation   √ √  √ √    √  √  √  √  √  √ 52% 
Analysis  √ √ √  √    √ √  √ √ √ √ √     52% 
Presentation   √ √  √ √  √ √  √     √    √ 42% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Database Forensic Investigation Process Model (DBFIPM) 
 
 
Consequently, employees also use client 
programs to access the database server, especially 
SQL Server. For example, when SQL Server is installed, 
other programs are also basically installed, such as ‘ 
MS SQL Server Management Studio ’ and PostgreSQL, 
followed by ‘ PostgreSQL pgAdmin III’;‘ MySQL Query 
Browser’ , a client used to access the MySQL server, 
and ‘Oracle SQL Developer’, a client used to access 
Oracle; and specific client programs to support 
various kinds of database products, such as 
‘SQLGate Series’ and ‘Toad Series’, which manage 
the access breakdown as a variety of file formats. 
Inside the files exists information about the server 
access breakdown, such as account names, server 
addresses, service port numbers, schema names, 
and passwords. Even though they are encoded, it is 
possible to decode them, that is, with such 
information; it is possible to access the database 
server by acquiring information about the account, 
even without knowing information about the 
account [34]. 
Detection Server Report is generated to give clear 
ground for investigators, users, and management. It 
will be given a clear view for current and 
newcomer’s investigators, to know how they should 
detect database servers in both cases, either in 
normal or in covert database corporations. Also, 
normal users and management will increase their 
knowledge about detecting database servers. 
Additionally, the next Identification Report will 
include this report and complete detail information 
about the identification phase. The purpose of this 
phase is to establish fundamentals for sharing 
investigation knowledge among database users and 
practitioners.  
Identifying proper investigation requirements and 
detecting investigation targets which are 
documented in detail in the detection server report 
give investigators starting points towards moving to 
detect database incidents and submit the final 
identification report to the top management and 
court. Detection database incident stage includes 
checking malicious activities and identifies database 
dimensions which are achieved by the identification 
team. Malicious activities are authorized or 
unauthorized actions which destroy database 
dimension integrity or confidentiality such as SQL 
injections attacks, malware attacks, fraud credit 
card, and steal records.  Database dimensions are 
database layers which mentioned in Section II. 
Identification teams are professional groups that 
have enough experts and training by using detection 
database forensic techniques and algorithms, 
moreover has full experiences in revealing database 
incidents.  
Identification 
Collection  
Preservation 
Analysis 
Presentation 
Check 
Authentic Data 
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Figure 2 Conceptual Databases Forensic Investigation Process Model 
 
 
Detection database forensic techniques and 
algorithms are special detection methods which are 
using by  identification team to scanning  database 
suspicious fields such as database detection 
algorithm [44], and database detection techniques 
[8, 45-47]. Mismanagement of detection techniques 
may lead to unexpected results or may be destroyed 
evidences. Database suspicious fields are fields that 
may be compromised, damaged or changed 
intentionally or unintentionally such as database files, 
data dictionary, logic schema and application 
schema. Data Integrity means checking whether the 
database system has detection tampering 
mechanism like strong cryptography one way hash 
function which applies in protecting the original 
data.   
The Identification Report is to produce and submit 
to the top management to make a decision either 
stop or continue with the investigation task. 
Identification report is a detailed preparation and 
detection report which carries specific and  
particular information about the identification 
process phase such as identification team names, 
experiences, skills, certificates, resources, database 
incidents, type of incidents , incident time, type of 
attacks, attack resources, vulnerabilities, investigation 
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techniques, type of database server, host machine, 
users, privileges, laws/regulations, policies, 
authentication and authorization files, cost and time 
etc. It records most of the investigators skills which 
may be used the next time similar incident happen.  
It will become a reference for both users and 
managements.  For users and newcomers it provides 
knowledge about which forensic investigation 
techniques and algorithms may be used during 
investigation and also what technical plans have the 
identification stage achieved? Furthermore, it offers 
a good background for management to know what 
investigation means. What are investigators 
responsibilities and roles? What are plans, strategies 
actions, costs, time of investigation? Top 
management is the a chief executive officer (CEO) 
who generally the most senior corporate officer 
(executive) or administrator in charge of managing a 
for-profit organizations. Thus, the decision will be 
taken by the CEO to continue or stop any 
investigation tasks, whether the decision is to 
continue investigation, an agreement must be 
written between organization and the investigation 
team. The CEO is therefore responsible for stopping or 
continuing the investigation task. 
Finally, the identification report will be submitted 
to the top management. There are two options: 
stopping the investigation task or continuing. In case 
of continuous investigation, the agreement must be 
written among the top management and the 
investigation team to avoid any prosecutions in the 
future. 
 
5.2  Collection and Preservation Phase 
 
Collecting and preserving evidences without 
damaging or altering it is very challenging for the 
investigators, thus the data must be backed up and 
copies saved before starting the collection process. 
Procedurally, extracting and preserving evidences 
from database systems are somehow similar to 
extracting and preserving networks, computers and 
mobile evidences, nevertheless the concepts and 
terminologies are totally different for example the 
database  artifacts include SQL cache, data cache, 
log transactions, data files, log files, control files, 
backup pieces, archive pieces, alert files, auditing 
files, trace files, configuration files, data dictionary 
views, authorization logs, authorization events, and so 
on. Furthermore, the collection and preservation 
team must have a good knowledge about database 
architecture and have licenses to allow him 
submitted evidences to court.  
Moreover, the collection techniques and tools 
must be specific and reliable.  The good feature of 
these phases which are illustrated in Figure 2 allows 
the user to build a customized model for example 
(dead acquisition, nonvolatile artifacts, and hash 
collected data concepts that consists dead 
acquisition model) which is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Indeed, this feature does not exist in other digital 
models because they were not concentrating on 
investigation concepts and their relationships.  
 
5.3  Analysis Phases 
 
Considers the core database forensic investigation 
phase which is used to analyze collected data and 
reveals: Who was tampering? When did tampering 
happen? What data was tampered with? Why and 
how did tampering happen? Figure 2 shows the 
concepts of the analysis and presentation phase. 
Therefore, collected and preserved data are 
presented in this phase and the authentic of the 
data checked. If the data is altered or damaged it 
will return to the collection phase to collect from the 
original data, nevertheless if the data is authentic, 
then the reconstruction process will begin. The recent 
backup set will restore and then recover database 
until failure happen by applying redoing or undoing 
log files [4, 10, 48, 49]. Forensic analysis algorithms [50] 
are used in revealing malicious activities and 
attackers. Database integrity is recovering using 
recovery techniques [45-47] to make consistent the 
database transactions and checkpoints. The results 
will be sent to the presentation phase. 
 
5.4  Presentation Phase 
 
The final stage is the presentation phase which is 
used to document the whole investigation task and 
then submit to the top management and court.  
Investigation documenting has many features which 
used to assist newcomers or investigators who face 
the same scenario in future and also useful for 
investigators to protect them from any future 
prosecution. It has many suggestions and 
recommendations which guide users and 
newcomers to increase their knowledge.  
 
 
6.0  CONCLUSION 
 
As a new and fast growing research field, knowledge 
about database forensic is important to be explored. 
In this paper, a generic model specific for database 
forensic investigation process, known as the DBFIPM is 
developed. To construct the DBFIPM, a number of 
existing investigation process models related to 
database is reviewed. From a thorough investigation 
against these models, the DBFIPM reveals that the 
database forensic investigation process has 5 
common process phases which include the: i) 
identification, ii) collection, iii) preservation, iv) 
analysis phase and v) presentation phase. To 
validate the completeness of the DBFIPM model, the 
FBS technique is applied against the model. The 
future works of this research is to detail out all 
concepts and relationships in each of the identified 
phases (in DBFIPM) by adapting a software 
engineering approach known as a metamodel. 
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